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DavidLewis’sPrincipal Principle (PP) states that our credence in a single case follows
from the general probability of all such cases. Against this stands the Challenge
Argument (CA) – to show that the inference is justified. Recent (1) law-to-chance,
(2) Bayesian, and (3) propensity theories of probability take up the challenge –
but, I argue, fall short. Rather, we should understand (4) propensity via Aristotle’s
analysis of spontaneity (5) and probabilistic reasoning via the Anti-PP and (6) the
practice of bundling one offs, where (7) forced bad-odds one offs illuminate how exten-
sive a role luck plays in our lives.
Our probabilistic reasoning is marred by the magical thinking that
probability applies to the single case, a belief that lies deep both in
our language itself – as we make such claims as ‘the odds are in our
favor in this case’; ‘the chances here and now are…’ – and also in influ-
ential and diverse interpretations of probability that each with quali-
fications accept David Lewis’s claim that ‘the only basic principle we
have about chance, the principle that tells us all we know’ is the
Principal Principle (PP) –
C(ao|e)|P∗(a|e = r) = r
– in which our credence, C, or strength of belief in a single case, ao,
given our evidence, e, is, or should be, equal to the general probabil-
ity, P*, of a as a type and as conditioned by the evidence, e. In short,
‘Chance is objective single-case probability’ and as such is operative
in the single case.1
The PP itself represents a rejection of a long-standing view that
probability could not be applied to the single case because of its
1 David Lewis, ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind, NS, 103
(1994), Symposium: Chance and Credence, 475 and 483. The various inter-
pretations, as we will see, tone down Lewis’s exuberance and then frame the
PP in their own terms.
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essential tie to observed frequencies.2 The standard view in effect
presented a Challenge Argument (CA): that a probability claim is an
idealization of a long-run frequency distribution and that hence
there is no way, minus a magical jump, to infer, or even give
meaning to, the probabilistic property of an item in that distribution,
ao, from the property of the distribution itself – P*(a).
Recently, the challenge has been taken up, prompted by aMoorean-
type intuition that we legitimately apply probability to the single case;3
by a belief that the objective probability of quantum mechanics seems
to put single-case probability at the forefront, as scientists speak of the
probability of the decay of this or that particular particle; and by a
belief that the CA could be met.
In this essay I will spend some time considering each of the main
views that seek to meet the CA – (1) law-to-chance, (2) Bayesian,
and (3) propensity theories – for only by doing so can we feel the
grip that the magical thinking of single-case probability reasoning
has on us and so free us from an orientation that is not onlymisleading
but also harmful by giving us a false confidence in our single-case rea-
soning. Then, more positively, I will (4) advance an understanding of
propensity that builds on Aristotle’s analysis of spontaneity and then
argue that probability (5) guides us by the Anti-PP, that warns us not
to apply probability to, or to bet on, the single case, (6) directs us to
bundle never to seldom repeated cases, one offs, into long-run projec-
tions, and (7) given the many forced bad-odds one offs we face, illumi-
nates how extensive a role luck plays in our lives. In the end, though,
after Wittgenstein’s observation that philosophy leaves everything as
2 Four decades ago Henry Kyburg, in his seminal Logical Foundations of
Statistical Inference (Dordrecht: Holland, D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1974) stressed that ‘probability can be attributed only to kinds of events or
sets and not (usefully) to individual events or to members of the sets that
belong to S ... We cannot talk about the probability that John Smith, a 40-
year old coal miner will survive for a year. This fact has been emphasized by
Neyman, by Reichenbach, by Salmon, by von Mises, by Cramer – by nearly
every serious writer who has adopted an empirical interpretation of probability:
probability is applicable only to sets of events or kinds of events’ (8).
3 Lewis himself – in his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, in
Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Vol. 2, ed., R.C. Jeffrey, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980) – grants that chance is ‘at bottom ...
really just a “folk” concept’, but one that carries with it an objective truth
(269).We shall see this idea – that chance, as objective single-case probability,
is basic in human belief – variously affirmed throughout the essay.
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it is, I will have said nothing other than, albeit perhaps illuminated
more, what we already implicitly know.
1.
Law-to-chance theories deny the CA by holding that probability
purports to provide a law or a law-like claim – an idealization of an
observed frequency – and that like any law, if true, holds in the
single case, and holds in a way that can only be construed as an entail-
ment. Lewis is very clear here, as he explains that why chance is
objective single-case probability ‘lies in remembering that single-
case chances follow from general probabilistic laws of nature’ – or
that ‘it seems intuitively right to rely on this information – namely,
that our credence should follow from our understanding of
chance… which itself is determined by a probability law that is pro-
jected into the future’.4Lewis justifies this deductive relationship on
the grounds that chance is objective – supervenient on and so deter-
mined by universal laws. Thus Lewis exclaims that ‘this is not epis-
temology! ... I am not talking about how evidence determines what’s
reasonable to believe about laws and chances. Rather, I’m talking
about how nature – the Humean arrangement of qualities – deter-
mines what’s true about the laws and chances. Whether there are
any believers living in the lawful and chancy world has nothing to
do with it’.5 Hence, while probability is based on long-run frequency
distributions, probability still figures in the single case; for chance,
the objective probabilistic property of the single case, ‘follows
from’ or is ‘determined by’ the objective probability of the sequence
itself. Thus, contra CA, one can legitimately infer P(ao) from P*(a)
just because P*(a) includes P(ao) .
Part of the lure of this reasoning is built on a seeming parallel
of probability laws and laws that yield regular regularities – regular-
ities that provide a direct link from the idealized regularity, the law,
to a particular instance of the law. For example, we observe that
objects fall at the rate of d= 12gt², that this, ao, is an object, and
so, ceteris paribus, deduce that it, ao, must fall (F) at the rate (R) of
d= 12gt²: (a) (Fa→Ra) & Fao / thus, Rao. So, too, by parallel reason-
ing, we observe that under cloud cover of type a it rains n% of the time
and that this single case, ao, is a cloud cover of type a, and so, again,
4 Op.cit. note 1, 477, 485.
5 Ibid. 481–482.
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deduce that it, ao, must have an n % chance of raining:
(1) [P∗(a) = n&ao]→ C(ao) = n
(2) [P∗(a) = n&ao]/thus C(ao) = n.
The reasoning seems so natural, but only in the way that the fallacy
of division is natural, as we too readily infer a property of the single
case, C(ao)= n, from a property of a collective, the long-run idealized
frequency in (1) – P*(a)= n.. Laws that characterize regular regular-
ities cover or entail their single cases: any departure of a single case
from the law is regarded at best as an anomaly and at worst as a refu-
tation. In sharp contrast, probability laws are irregular regularities:
they are sequences with multiple results where the results empirically
hover around some mathematical idealized ratio – the regularities –
but have no algorithm as to what particular event (the single case)
happens next – the irregularities. Consequently, such laws, by defin-
ition, do not cover or entail the single case at all but only the long-run
frequency. This is why no single case can refute any probabilistic
claim; if the long-run frequency does not hover around the idealized
ratio, then, and only then, may we question the law6 This is also why
we regard it as childish to complain when our ‘really good odds’ – say,
betting on the straight flush – do not come out ‘as expected’ and so tell
that ‘child’ that such irregularities happen, so deal.
More recently, Jenann Ismael has reworked Lewis’s view of chance
while keeping to his central idea that chance is probability law applied
to the single case.7 Like Lewis, she sees the PP as basic, as a deep-set
6 Throughout this essay I will slide by two difficult problems – the ref-
erence class problem: how, if at all, to determine just what probabilistic distri-
bution a single case best fits into; and the (dis)confirmation problem: how to
(dis)confirm idealized ratios – e.g., to determine how long a sequence must be
before it can (dis)confirm some probabilistic projection.Whatever answers are
given to these questions will not negate or weaken what I say about the
inapplicability of probability to the single case. For any view on applied prob-
ability faces these two problems; and what I say throughout this essay about
single-case probability is independent of one’s solutions to either of these
problems.
7 As Jenann Ismael puts it – in her ‘AModest Proposal about Chance’,
The Journal of Philosophy, CVII (2011) – while ‘general probabilities apply
to classes and do not generally have a time index’, ‘[s]ingle case probabilities
... are unconditional, time-dependent, and pertain to particular occurrences’
– e.g., ‘that this particular roll of these particular dice… on this day comes up
double sixes’ (421 and 418). (Ismael’s emphases)
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folk belief: an analytic truth anchored in our linguistic framework,
one of the ‘things that anyone who “grasps the concept” of chance
will be able to tell you’.8 However, in developing her concept of
chance, Ismael leaves Lewis’s objective orientation toward law and
chance for an epistemic and ‘pragmatic reorientation ... that physical
theories are practical and epistemic tools ... not part of the fundamen-
tal ontology ... [but] best thought of as partially prepared solutions to
frequently encountered problems’ – what ‘holds for creatures like
us’.9 And what in particular holds for creatures like us is a probabil-
istic law that is inherently connected to our temporal location –
namely,
‘Def:Cht(e) = PrG(e/pre-t history)
where PrG(A/B) is the general [limit-case, idealized frequency] prob-
ability that a random pick from the B’s will yield an A’ and where
Cht(e) is ‘the chance of e assessed at t’.10 By Def in particular we
can escape Lewis’s exorbitant understanding of chance as holding
for all time: we can now both say that Napoleon had a chance of
victory at Waterloo – for the chance then was understood in terms
of pre-Waterloo history – and also say that there is no chance now,
post Waterloo, that Napoleon could be victorious. The primary
advantage of Def by far though is its unifying role: it ‘explains the
epistemic role of chance’ by specifying chance as ‘merely a special
case of … PrG’.11
As impressive as Ismael’s advances on Lewis are,12 to show that
chance is a special case of PrG she must show how this understanding
8 Ibid. 420.
9 Ibid. 442 and 441. Ismael later further frames her pragmatic orienta-
tion in terms of a block or timeless universe, thereby taking any dynamic
chanciness out of probability. But none of this directly bears on her reply
to the CA and can be bypassed.
10 Ibid. 431 and 425. As Ismael writes: ‘The only specific information a
situated human agent has about the world is information about past events’
(439). Later, she sharpens this definition to make it more in line with rela-
tivistic theories by speaking of the light cones of a point, p, rather than
the history of e at t (436) and by placing law and chance within a relativistic
timeless or block universe.
11 Op. cit., note 7, 430.
12 Perhaps Ismael’s most impressive advance on Lewis is found in her
essay, ‘Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug’, Nous 42 (2008), 292–307 – in
which she dissolves Lewis’s worry that a probability law, P*, would admit
as probable a competing law, P1, that would in turn contradict the probabil-
ities of P*. To sidestep Lewis’s dodgy appeal to ‘inadmissible evidence’,
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meets the CA. How can she infer Cht(e) from PrG? In reply, Ismael
tries to connect Lewis’s deductive justification of the CA with
another inference that is also implicit in Def, namely, the inference
to PrG(e/pre-t history) from the evidential basis. Ismael defends
this inference, what I will call the upward link, by relying on
Bernoulli’s law: ‘as the size of the ensemble increases’, it typically ap-
proaches the objective probability PrG(A/B). This law provides ‘a
necessary, probabilistic [upward] link between probabilities and fre-
quencies’. However, the law comes with a ‘bad-news addendum: …
The possibility of divergence remains, no matter how large the
ensemble’.13 That is, the more items we observe ‘in a typical ensem-
ble of systems in ψ’ the more likely it is, but with no guarantees
because of the bad news addendum, that ‘the general probability of
a/ψ’ is approached.14 And this in turn, Ismael writes, ‘gives us’ the
downward ‘chance-frequency link’, which she expresses formulaical-
ly: ‘if S is in a state ψ there is a necessary but approximate and
probabilistic relation between the chance of observing e in an x-meas-
urement on S and the relative frequency of e in x-measurements on
systems in ψ’.15
But first, how the upward link connects with the downward link
Ismael never makes clear. All she says, laconically, is that the
upward link ‘gives us’, or will ‘provide’ us with, the downward
‘chance-frequency link’. Yet to observe that some set of items, all
these a’s together, hover around a/ψ – the basis of the upward link
– does not ‘provide’ us with any downward link – that this ao
hovers or tends to hover around a/ψ – anymore than it is to observe
that the average height of a male giraffe is 5.2 meters is to say that
the height of this male giraffe here and now is 5.2 meters or even
tends to be 5.2 meters. Our knowledge of the properties of an aggre-
gate like a frequency does not rely on the items of the aggregate having
the properties of the aggregate.
evidence that allows him to rule out competing laws, Ismael distinguished
between ‘reasoning within the scope of a theory’ and ‘reasoning about the-
ories’ (296), where reasoning within the scope of the theory does not allow




15 Ibid. Ismael initially defines probability in terms of quantum me-
chanics (419) but throughout the essay uses instances from ordinary life,
on behalf of ‘creatures like us’ (442).
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And second, whatever one thinks of the upward link as framed by
Bernoulli’s law, the downward link is a straight-out fallacy. The
fallacy can be readily seen by applying Ismael’s formulaic presenta-
tion of the downward link above to a more concrete instance, say: If
the weather [S] is in a particular barometric state [ψ] there is a neces-
sary but approximate and probabilistic relation between the chance of
observing rain here and now [eo] given a barometric reading [an
x-measurement] on the weather [S] and the relative frequency of
rain [e] given barometric readings [x-measurements] on systems in
a particular barometric state [ψ]. Clearly, this commits the same
fallacy of division found in Lewis: it jumps from the property of
the frequency – the relative frequency of e (rain) given x-(barometric)
measurements on systems in ψ – to a property of a member of the fre-
quency – the chance of observing eo (rain) here and now given an x-
(barometric) measurement on S (the weather). Whether chance is
objective and metaphysically dynamic, after Lewis, or merely epi-
stemic and pragmatic, after Ismael, we still can’t cross the chasm
from the idealized frequency of the aggregate to the single case.
2.
One quick and easy way to cross the probability-chance chasm would
be to reject the CA’s assumption that there is a need to legitimately
infer P(ao) from P*(a) for the reason that probability claims are not
based on our observations of any long-run frequencies but on our
willingness to bet, to lay odds, on the single case. Hence there is no
jump from probability to the single case, for probability, defined
by the odds we are willing to lay on the single case, is of the single
case. But such a way out offers the hocus pocus of bare belief in
place of the surer grounding that observed frequencies supply. As
Clark Glymour observed, such credence is ‘remote’ from ordinary
life as well as from science, for it is about one’s opinion, not about
nature or the legitimacy of one’s daily decisions.16 Probability
should guide us and not we it.
Bayesians, like Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, seek to escape
this charge of mere subjectivism, while retaining the idea of prob-
ability as built on the practice of a bet, through grounding prob-
ability in objective mathematical (Bayesian) formulas and then
arguing that these formulas both support and then, indeed,
require the PP. They in particular work from the first form of
16 Clark Glymour, ‘Instrumental Probability’,Monist 84 (2001), 285.
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Bayes’s Theorem –
P∗(h|e) = [P(e|h) × P(h)/P(e)]
– where the right side determines the left. That is, to determine P* –
the posterior probability: the probability of h (the hypothesis or claim
in question) given e (the evidence) – multiply one’s estimate of the
inverse probability, the probability of e given h, by one’s estimate of
the prior probability, the probability of h itself, all divided by one’s
estimate of the evidential probability, the probability of the evidence
alone –where one’s probability estimates still demarcate the odds one
is personally willing to bet on.17 The posterior probability that it will
rain given this type of cloud structure, for instance, is determined by
one’s probability estimate of this type of cloud structure given that it
is raining times one’s estimate of the prior probability of it raining at all
divided by one’s probability estimate of this cloud structure obtain-
ing. What results, then, is ‘a perfectly objective logic of inductive
inference, whose “premises” can be just those prior probabilities,
with Bayes’s Theorem as the inference engine generating a valid con-
clusion: the posterior distribution’. Just as in deductive logic, they
add, ‘you choose the premises, and the engine generates the valid
conclusions’.18
Note, though, that these ‘valid conclusions’ obtained by ‘objective
logic’ are limit cases: mathematical ratios of infinite sequences. How
then do Howson and Urbach move from these to a degree of credence
in an item of the sequence without committing a fallacy of division?
What justifies the inference from P*(a) to P(ao)? In reply, they
provide two arguments.
The first argument is a weaker version of Lewis’s deductive jus-
tification for the PP: that ‘(a) objective probabilities [P*(a)] are
numerical measures of tendencies scaled in the closed unit interval
[0 to 1] and (b) that personal probabilities [P(ao)] reflect personal
assessments of relative likelihoods, strongly suggest that conditional
17 Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian
Approach, Third Edition (Chicago: Open Court, 2006), 237. They add here
that Bayesians start with a prior probability distribution, which ‘reflects a
person’s belief before the experimental results are known’ – ‘subjective, ...
illusive, idiosyncratic ... likely to vary from person to person’ (237). But
that said, they then stress that the formula, ideally, and in fact generally, is
sensitive to the accumulation of evidence – the observed frequencies or
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on your sole information that the data source possesses a definite
tendency to produce outcomes as measured by P*, your personal
probability of an a-type outcome [P(ao)] should be equal to
P*(a)’: P(ao)|(P*(a)= r)= r.19
But why ‘strongly suggested’, why ‘appropriate’? For the inference
fromP*(a), the property of a sequence, to a belief regarding an item in
the sequence, Pao, is a textbook instance of the fallacy of division. As
with Lewis and Ismael, so with Howson and Urbach, there is a
magical jump from one’s credence in the overall projection, P*(a),
to one’s credence in any single case within the overall projection,
P(ao). That one’s credence is subjective, moreover, does not matter.
For while it is certainly the case that one’s credence should match
what is objective, the objectivity that one’s credence should match
here is the property we claim to know – the limit-case frequency –
and not a component of that property, the single case.
Howson and Urbach do not stop here, however, but offer a second
argument, one that makes the much stronger claim that the PP is re-
quired by probabilistic reasoning: without it ‘the subjective probabil-
ity formalism would be empty of anymethodological content’.20 For,
they ask, how can ‘finite sample data… provide information about a
chance parameter even when this parameter refers to an in-principle
unobservable limit’?21 And, similarly (and prior) to Ismael’s strategy
of connecting the downward link with the upward link, they reply
that it is only through the PP that the ‘sample data … [can] provide
any information at all about objective probabilities’.22 How the
sample data can provide such information, and where the PP neces-
sarily fits into this process, takes ‘three steps’ to show – first, ‘to
recall that … objective probabilities satisfy the axioms of the prob-
ability calculus’; and, second, to note that these axioms are framed
by ‘Kollektivs [as] Bernoulli sequences [limit cases defined as so]:
the probability of any outcome is independent of the outcome at
any point, and is constant from point to point’23; and, as the ‘third
19 Ibid. 76. And later, given P*(a)= r, ‘then, in the absence of any other
relevant information, the appropriate subjective degree of belief that the
event will occur is also r’ (174).Whether the ‘data source possesses a definite
tendency to produce outcomes as measured by P*’ will be considered in the
discussion on propensity theories.
20 Ibid. 77.
21 Ibid. 78 (their emphasis).
22 Ibid. 77. They add that this capacity of the sample data to provide
such objective information at first glance ‘seems frankly almost beyond
belief’.
23 Ibid. (my emphasis)
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and final step’, to use ‘the resources of [their Bayesian] theory of epi-
stemic probability’, the PP, and Bayes’s Theorem, to compute the
posterior probability. By this they aim to demonstrate that the idea-
lized frequency they derive (and continually improve on) tends to
hone in on the objective frequency. Hence, in the end, Howson and
Urbach see the PP not as a merely appropriate belief given objective
probability claims but as a necessary belief, grounding the very pos-
sibility of probability claims.
But, first, there is something strange in the above argument in
that it suggests a disbelief in what is being argued for. For note
that Howson and Urbach could have seemingly justified the PP
by stopping at the second step – the downward link. For this step
defines the properties of a Bernoulli sequence, in which the prob-
ability of any outcome is constant from point to point. If, though,
the probability of any outcome were constant from point to point,
any application of PP – any inference to P(ao) from P*(a) – would
immediately follow. For P*(a) is a Bernoulli sequence that is
arrived at by Bayes’s Theorem. Hence, if a Bernoulli sequence is
the primary conclusion of Bayes’s Theorem, and if a Bernoulli
sequence is such that the probability of any outcome is constant
from point to point, what follows is the PP. But Howson and
Urbach rightfully refrain from making this deduction. For
Bernoulli sequences are high mathematical abstractions, occupying
a platonic mathematical world far removed from our empirical
becoming. Hence, to justify the PP by appealing to an attribute
of a Bernoulli sequence either would equivocate on probability –
to switch from a high mathematical abstraction of probability as
defined by a Bernoulli sequence to probability in ordinary life –
or would commit a fallacy of division – to infer a property of an
item in an idealized empirical sequence from a property of that
sequence as a whole.
And so, Howson and Urbach add the third step, the step that
brings us into the fluidity of daily reasoning, where they argue that
the PP is necessary to reason to a Bernoulli sequence – an ‘upward
link’. But is this so? To see why not, we might refer back to the
point made regarding Ismael’s upward link – that one does not
need probability to apply to the single case in order to infer the prob-
ability of a collective of single cases – the limit case. Bur more, even if
we are Bayesians and ‘shooting from the hip’, even then, and in the
spirit of Howson and Urbach, we should aim to frame our subjective
estimates in terms of a (Bernoulli) idealized probabilistic sequence –
stating our bet onwhat would happen in the long run – that this single
case (ao) fits into a collective that as a whole is defined by P*(a). That
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is, even when we estimate the probability ‘of’ some single case, our
estimation is not of – does not directly bear on – that case itself but
is of – directly bears on – the limit-case sequence into which that
type of case fits. As von Mises noted, and noted in discussing
Bayes, it is ‘not too reprehensible’ to affirm with ‘“great certainty”
... that this event will occur on one specific trial ... as long as we
realize that it is only an abbreviation and that its real meaning is
that the event occurs almost always in an infinitely long sequence
of observations’; for without such an empirically grounded
meaning, probabilistic claims would ‘lose their relation to reality’
and would be relegated to a mere subjectivism – precisely what
Howson and Urbach work so admirably to overcome.24
3.
What we have found so far is that the attempts to answer the CA by
establishing a legitimate inference to the single case – via a scientific
law or a Bernoulli sequence – only make clear just how much of a
magical jump such inferences make and how much we want to
make – how far we are willing to go to rationalize – such inferences.
Another way out, as we have seen, would be to ascribe probability
to the single case itself. But how can this be donewithout succumbing
to a mere subjectivism? Propensity theorists answer this question by
advancing probability as causally located in the single case.25 Hence
24 Richard von Mises Probability, Statistics, and Truth, second revised
English edition prepared by Hilda Geiringer (London: George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd., 1957), 116 and 125
25 As David W. Miller – in his Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and
Defence (Peru, IL: Open Court, 1994) – writes: ‘Propensities depend on the
situation today ... Only in this way do we attain the specificity to resolve the
problem of the single case’ (186). However, not all propensity theorists hold
that propensity is of the single case, whether understood as an object
(Peirce), the experimental set up (Popper) or the light cone of one’s place
in the universe (Miller). For instance, Donald Gillies – in his ‘Varieties of
Propensity’, British Journal of Philosophy of Science 51 (December, 2000),
807–835 – argues that propensity does not lie in the single case but in the
sequence as a whole. He nonetheless believes that probability applies to
the single case by in effect accepting a version of the appeal to appropriate-
ness as proposed by Howson and Urbach in their 1993 second edition of
Scientific Reasoning, where they argue that ‘single case probabilities ... are
not themselves objective’ but ‘subjective probabilities, which considerations
of consistency nonetheless dictate must be set equal to the objective
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there is no jump from probability to the single case for there is an
underlying propensity, an objective tendency, in the single case that
is manifested by some probability – a probability that over the long
run comes out as a (dis)confirmable frequency.
That said, one question that immediately comes to the fore is just
what propensity is. As Clark Glymour noted, propensity seems to
offer nothing more than what is ‘revealed in a long-run … sequence
of experimental trials of the same kind’. Like Moliere’s dormitive
virtue in his ‘The Imaginary Invalid’, which lampoons a group of
physicians for purporting to explain why sleep follows the intake of
opium – because it has a dormitive property – propensity seems to
be merely repetitive, an empty term. So, Glymour concludes, propen-
sity is ‘a physical property that cannot be recorded and does not
necessitate or preclude any occurrence’, but merely repeats what
the idealized ratio of the aggregate tells us.26 There seems to be no
reality, no ‘it’, to it.
Recently, Mauricio Suárez addressed this problem by framing his
answer ‘squarely in Peirce’s pragmatist tradition’,27 thereby freeing
him from having to justify the idea of propensities by some positivis-
tic reduction of propensities to empirical observations. Rather, they
are ‘hypothetical ... the result of inference’ to the best explanation –
an explanation that demarcates ‘a new and sui generis relation’ that
specifies the ‘underlying dispositional properties of things, with
probabilities just when all you know about the single case is that it is an
instance of the relevant collective’ (813). Again: an inference from the prop-
erty of the collective to that of an item in the collective.
26 Op.cit., note 16, 284.
27 Mauricio Suárez, ‘Propensities and Pragmatism’, The Journal of
PhilosophyCX (2013), 68. Suárez grounds his view on five Peircean-inspired
pragmatic maxims, in brief: (1) Understand concepts in terms of their
effects, but also (2) avoid the positivistic simplicities that identify hypothet-
ical entities with their empirical manifestations; (3) see ‘philosophy as con-
tinuous with science … bringing its own specific techniques to bear on
scientific problems’; (4) ‘avoid reducing causal efficacy and causation to any-
thing empirically accessible, such as frequency or correlation’; and (5) ‘be
open to those scientific theories that postulate hypothetical or fictional
entities’ via ‘[a]bduction or ... “inference to the best explanation”’
(69–72). Suárez also focuses on ‘Humphrey’s Paradox’, where he rejects
what he calls the ‘identity thesis’ that equates probability and propensity –
holding instead that ‘propensities … are distinct from their probabilistic
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frequencies as their empirical manifestations’.28 Such manifestations
are ‘probabilistic displays’ with ‘a particular result’ – as, say, this fair
diemanifests itself as a probability distribution of 1/6 of a named side
coming up.29 Such probabilistic displays are in the single case: they
are expressed ‘as probabilities in every single experimental trial’.30
Hence, Suárez distinguishes ‘between the dispositional property of
the system (the propensity), its manifestation or effect in each single
trial (the probability), and the consequences in the long run of the
experiment (the frequency)’. While the propensity is not observable
in the single case, it explains and so grounds the probability of the
single case – namely, ‘as the exercise of the underlying disposition,
which displays itself in a probability’ both of which in turn are revealed
in the consequences, a long-run frequency distribution.31
The question facing any such understanding of propensity is
whether it escapes Moliere. To see why not, note that there is an
almost exact analogy between Moliere’s sleep following the intake
of opium/dormitive virtue pair and Suárez’s probability/propensity
pair. Hence to reject the first pair is also to reject the second.
First, each pair has a side that is an observation and a side that is a
purported explanation of the observation where, though, the obser-
vation and its purported explanation mutually justify each other in
such a way as to merely repeat what the other says. For instance,
Suárez holds that atomic decay in the single case is ‘adequately ex-
plained by the propensity invoked (the element’s “half-life”) and
its display in the appropriate probability of decay within a given
period of time’.32 The particles are observed to decay at this rate
because they have a propensity, a half-life, to do so. And why do
we believe they have this half-life? – because they decay at this rate.
And why do we believe they decay at this rate? – because they have
this half life. But this is no different from saying that we observe
28 Ibid. 73. Or: They are ‘theoretical properties ascribed to objects by
scientists in an attempt to explain phenomena involving those objects as dis-
positional properties with probabilistic displays or manifestations’ (87).
29 Ibid. 87 (Suárez’s emphasis). While Suárez initially presents propen-
sities as powers or causes, even mentioning ‘Aristotle’s efficient causation’
(68), he later, on pragmatist grounds, further refines this and asserts that
the relation need not be causal. ‘It is an empirical matter to determine, for
any particular property whether it is causally related to its manifestations’
(88). How a manifestation relates to a propensity that does not cause it he
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that sleep follows the intake of opium because it has a dormitive
virtue. And why do we believe it has a dormitive virtue? – because
sleep follows the intake of opium. And why do we believe sleep
follows the intake of opium? – because it has a dormitive virtue.
Second, that the observation and its purported explanation merely
repeat each other can be further illuminated by the insight that the
observed frequency and the disposition purporting to explain it are
explained by the same thing – some underlying set of properties.
To use Suárez’s own example of fragility as the underlying dispos-
ition explaining ‘easily breakable’, why glass is fragile is explained
by the same underlying properties as explaining why glass is easily
breakable. Why the intake of opium is followed by sleep is explained
by the same underlying properties as explain the dormitive virtue of
opium. So, too, why some frequency has a certain probability is ex-
plained by the same underlying properties that explain why that fre-
quency has a ‘propensity’ to display such a probability. More, to
appeal to an underlying propensity to explain a quantum mechanical
probabilistic event is to revert to Einstein’s insistence that there must
be some cause underlying the event itself – albeit in this case a ‘cause’
that merely repeats the idealized probabilistic sequence. Hence, any
appeal here to Peircean abduction or inference to the best explanation
provides no relief. For when the explanation and the to-be-explained
are explained by the same thing, then the standards of Peircean
abduction themselves reject the explanation as advancing our
understanding.
Finally, the analogy between dormitive virtue and propensity is only
almost exact in that to say that propensity adds an explanation and is
manifested in P*(a)= r is worse than saying that dormitive virtue ex-
plains opium being sleep inducing – or to say that Energeia explains
and is manifested in E=mc2. While these latter two are each scientific
danglers – doing no work, unifying no formula – at least dormitive
virtue and Energeia call for us to seek out the underlying properties
that would explain them. But there is no hunt in the offing for the
physical properties of a sui generis, whether propensity or probability
– no charge, no spin… – nothing to be searched for, as we hunt, say,
for the physical properties of a boson or a meson – or as we might
hunt for the physical properties of dormitive virtue or Energeia.
4.
Nonetheless, probabilities, irregular regularities, don’t just happen,
and that they don’t just happen is one of the key reasons backing
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the conviction that there must be some one thing, perhaps even a sui
generis thing, to explain the regularity that contains the irregularity.
As Alan Hájek notes, ‘It is not as if facts about the collective
impose some constraint on the behavior of the actual sequence …
something that would impose such a constraint – probabilistic, to be
sure – is a single case probability that is fixed from trial to trial. For
example, we explain the fact that our coin landed Heads roughly
half the time in 1,000 tosses with the hypothesis that its single case
probability of Heads is roughly 12, constant across trials, and that
the trials are independent of each other’.33 But if this means, as it
does for Suárez, that there is an underlying cause – and the name of
that cause is ‘propensity’ (for Suárez) or ‘probability’ (for Hájek) –
then it only invites the mirth of Moliere.
Why such regularities don’t just happen and yet are not to be ex-
plained by some underlying propensity (or probability) can be un-
earthed by harking back to Aristotle’s analysis of spontaneity and
chance. Aristotle took spontaneity to be a ‘third class of events’, des-
ignating what comes to pass but ‘neither of that which is by necessity
and always, nor of that which is for the most part’, where chance, he
added, is spontaneity within the framework of purposeful action – as a
surprise meeting in the market.34 ‘Both belong to the mode of caus-
ation “source of change”, for either some natural or intelligent agent
is always the cause; but in this sort of causation the number of pos-
sible causes is infinite… [and] have in fact been caused by something
accidentally’.35 Thus to say that a spontaneous event is ‘unaccount-
able’ is correct, for it has a bewildering array of causes, so many
and various as to be beyond measure, that merge into a single case –
that chance meeting in the market. Aristotle consequently did not
33 AlanHájek, “Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism’,
Erkenntnis 70 (2009), 225. Hájek makes the same point in his predecessor
essay – “‘Mises Redux’ – Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite
Frequentism’, Erkenntnis 45 (1996), 209–227: ‘I think the frequentist has
things backwards. Surely it is the coin’s probability of landing heads that
gives rise to its statistics, rather than the other way around’ (216). ‘Gives
rise to’ – as if probability is some underlying cause?
34 Aristotle,Physics, trans., R.P. Hardie and R.K.Gaye, inThe Complete
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed., Jonathan Barnes,
Volume One, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984),
196:12–13. Aristotle was not thinking of probability, of which he had not a
glimmer, when he spoke of what comes to pass for the most part, but of con-
tingency – as in a boulder not falling because it was lodged on the edge of a
cliff.
35 Ibid. 198a 2–3
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see spontaneity as a ‘unique and sui generis’ cause in itself but rather
took it as a term of art ‘about’ causes, like the term ‘means of trans-
port’ is ‘about’ an indefinite number of ways of transportation –
hobby horses, scooters, carts, bikes, cars, trains, planes, horses,
strong backs, … – with no clear closure but designating in the case
of ‘spontaneity’ that vast array of causes of events that are individually
explicable up to a point but beyond any general accountability.
Propensity, I submit, is like spontaneity, ‘belonging to the mode of
causation “source of change”’, but now a fourth class of event. While
‘spontaneity’ designates an array of multiple and varying causes,
this or that or whatnots, that unpredictably come together to bring
about a single case, an irregular irregularity, ‘propensity’ designates
an array of multiple and varying causes that unpredictably come
together to bring about a single case, but over time bring together
this type of single case in a way that hovers around some idealized
ratio – an irregular regularity.36 Neither concept – spontaneity or pro-
pensity – scientifically explains anything, for neither designates any
specific underlying cause or primitive that we can further investigate.
Both are abstractions that designate a hodgepodge of an indefinite and
varying number of causes.37
Why, for instance, did the die come up six on this throw? On the
one hand, we could say with Aristotle that the number of causes is
indefinite, and so ‘unaccountable’ – the dirt on the die, the wrist
movement of the thrower, where and how the die was gripped, how
the thrower followed through on the throw, the surface the die
landed on, and where, and at what angle, the density of the air
itself, ... perhaps even, to jump from Aristotle to Epicurus, the
‘swerve’ of an uncaused event. On the other hand, we could say
with Hume that the event is uncaused, that ‘chance is nothing real
36 Whether it is possible to put the happenings of irregular irregularities
into an idealized sequence I will leave to those who have the courage to
define ‘this or that or whatnots’ – or even ‘market surprises’.
37 This is not to deny that probabilistic laws provide a scientific ‘explan-
ation’, just that propensities as underlying causes of such laws provide such
an explanation. Just how probabilistic laws explain, of course, is another
issue. But even if, as Wesley C. Salmon argues – in his ‘Explaining
Things Probabilistically’, The Monist 84 (2001), 208–217 – probabilistic
laws explain the single case, they are not effective in the single case. As
Salmon notes, ‘statistical explanations – inmany cases, at least – are not argu-
ments’ (210). For explanation goes oneway, from the single case to the law; it
is after the fact. In contrast, a guide, like a prediction or argument, goes the
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in itself, and, properly speaking, is merely the negation of a cause, its
influence on the mind is contrary to that of causation’.38 For when
we find no regularity other than the framework of the irregular regular-
ity itself, we have no specific causal, i.e., predictive or accountable,
factor to appeal to in the single case. What we have instead is an indef-
inite but finite, relatively closed, interconnected, and exceedingly
complex system of variously weighted causes, such that, no surprise,
there will be these recurring long-run idealizations just because there
are only so many options for the world causes to work out as they do.39
In sum, Hájek is quite right to insist that what we want to know is
the probability of the single case, one’s own case: ‘the fact that [a
person] ultimately cares about is a fact about himself – one expressed
by a meaningful “probability of death” statement that refers to a
single person’.40 But this desire is ambiguous and is in danger of blur-
ring the problem of the reference class with that of the single case. A
fact that we legitimately desire to know about ourselves is what
precise reference class – what particular distribution of possibilities
– we fit into. But even knowing that does not tell us what we really,
and, alas, illegitimately, want to know – namely, what our ‘single-
38 David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 125.
39 This understanding of propensity as involving multiple and varying
causes, admittedly, will not address quantum mechanics. Henry E. Kyburg
– in his ‘Propensities and Probabilities’, The British Journal of the
Philosophy of Science 25 (1974) – notes the striking difference between radio-
active decay and, say, dying. ‘If we could identify people chemically and
physically so as to put them in a small number of classes, and that is all
we could do, then we would be home free’ in taking radioactive decay and
dying as similar. ‘But precisely in distinction to the decay of radioactive ele-
ments, we can often identify the cause of a person’s demise’ (366). The point
is, if we could identify the cause of the half-life, as in discovering the under-
lying properties of a ‘propensity’, we would have left the swerve of quantum
mechanics for some underlying Einsteinean cause. And, whatever, probabil-
ity would not be of the single case except elliptically.
40 Alan Hájek, op. cit, note 33, 218. Similarly, Christopher Hitchcock –
in ‘Causal Generalizations and Good Advice,’ The Monist 84 (2001),
218–241 – starts with the PP as a ‘useful framework for thinking about the
relationship between subjective probabilities and beliefs about objective
probabilities’ (235) but adds that the PP needs a supplement, an answer to
the reference class problem, by insisting that the probabilistic law is
framed as directly as possible to the specific case so that there is less of a
gap between them. But a gap in this instance is a chasm – not to be
bridged by a magical jump from the real probability of the aggregate to
the imaginary probability of the single case.
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case probability’ is – as if probability is a cause, or has propensity as a
cause, that works to favor us in our single case. Even with getting the
reference class exactly right, in other words, the single case has no
probability of its own but remains, as randomness requires, a happen-
stance within the probability of the sequence as a whole. With
Aristotle, as with Hume, a concept like chance demarcates the
limits of explanation and is no explanation itself. While this is not
to go so far as Glymour, who relegates probability to the netherworld
of ‘Locke’s substance… something we know not what’,41 it does limit
our understanding of probability to a class of varying and myriad
causes coming together in a relatively closed and finite universe.
5.
If probability does not apply to the single case, how, if at all, can it be
a guide in our lives? This question expresses what I take to be the
deepest motivation for single-case probability reasoning: probability
really is a guide in our lives and as a guide is so in the single case. How,
then, do we bring together these three necessities – that probability is
a guide in our lives, that we act in the single case, and that probability
does not apply to the single case? The answer, no matter what view of
probability we take – law-based, Bayesian, even propensity – is to dis-
tinguish between being a guide in the single case and applying to the
single case.
First, probability guides us in the single case by framing single
cases within (dis)confirmable idealizations of irregular regularities –
where frequentists insist that their idealizations are to be tested,
after Bas C. Van Fraasen, by ‘vindications’ like the Brier Score: a
combination of ‘informativeness or extremeness’ – the closer to 1 or
0 the higher the score; and by ‘calibration’ – ‘that the forecasts fit
the series of actual events perfectly’, e.g., that it really does rain
40% of the time on a 40% forecast;42 where Bayesians, like Howson
and Urbach, stress that their instantiated Bayesian formulas are to
be improved by subsequent observations or reasons, always placing
probability within a Bernoulli-defined collective; and where
41 Op. cit., note 16, 299.
42 Bas C. Van Fraasen, ‘Calibration: A Frequency Justification for
Personal Probability’, in Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in
Honor of Adolf Grünbaum, eds, R.S. Cohen and L. Lauden (Boston: D.
Reidel Publishing Company, 1983) Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, vol. 76, 300.
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propensity theorists, like Suárez, insist that any propensity be ‘dis-
played’ and so tested by its long-run consequences.
That is, probability guides us in the single case by underlining that,
however we interpret probability, we must ground it in some type of
long-run projection – from idealized observed frequencies to
Bernoulli sequences to propensity-driven observed consequences.
The abstract mathematical coin flip by itself is no practical interest
to us other than to model what we discover what actually happens
in real coin flips. Whatever we might think of Molinieux’s blind
person seeing a cube for the first time, until we see a sequence play
out over time, the mathematics doesn’t transfer into our experience.
First came the games of chance, the empirical die rolls, and only
after that the mathematical models, and only then, with the owl of
Minerva, the interpretations of probability. And what these models
and interpretations give us, as I have argued, and as professional gam-
blers insist, is not anything in regard to the single case but projections
– namely, what is to be anticipated in the long run, whether in terms
of laws, Bayesian formulas, or propensity-driven consequences.
Hence, and second, probability guides us negatively by warning
that chance is the inapplicability of limit-case sequences to the
single case. Chance serves as a warning of the vagaries of irregular
regularities – that there is no or no known algorithm within the
sequence. To see chance as an underlying reality gives us the false
confidence that the odds are in our favor here and now, when all the
odds do – to repeat, as lawful or Bayesian or propensity-driven (dis)-
confirmable idealizations – is cover the aggregate.
As a result, and paradoxically, probability guides us by underlining
that the one crucial idea behind probability is to avoid applying prob-
abilistic credence to the single case at all. Contra Lewis, the ground-
ing principle of probability is not thePrincipal Principle but theAnti-
Principal Principle (APP): chance does not apply to the single case
and thus our probabilistically-based decisions, our ‘bets’, should
never be focused on the single case. Professional gamblers see this
with eyes wide open. As Orange County KO, a former black jack pro-
fessional gambler, put it, ‘Serious players ... measure their result in
terms of EV [the normative expected value of the game] ... a simple
formula: EV= overall edge * average bet * hands per hour * hours
played ... [where, following this] you can rest assured that your
losing streak is simply a result of negative variance ... let the math
take care of itself’.43
43 Orange County KO, ‘Mastering Your Reaction to Losses’,Blackjack
Forum XXIII (Spring, 2003). While this is expressed in terms of a
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There is a profound difference between the PP, allowing us to think
that one has a good probability in this case – the die’s coming up not-
six – and the APP, or better still, its amplified version, the EV, that
the die will come up not-six about five-sixths of the time over the
long run. This is a conceptual as well as a psychological point: to
think in terms of the PP is to think in terms of the single case
rather than a long-run projection. It is to put the weight of one’s
bet, the reliance of one’s judgment, on something that does not
exist, namely, that probability is working in one’s favor here and
now – say, the good five-sixths chance that six won’t come up. To
think in terms of the APP and EV is to be made acutely aware of
the vagaries of a five-sixths ratio and the necessity of being able and
willing to stay for the long run. It might be more fun and exciting
to view chance as operative in the single case. But it is no way to
manage one’s life. One should play the long run or not at all. As
another professional gambler, ‘Jimmy’, put it, ‘Amateurs expect to
win – after all, you’re supposed to win when you have an edge,
right? ... This is a monumental mistake ... The point is this: anything
is possible on a given day – after all, it’s gambling. ... Some days you’ll
lose, some days you’ll win – it really doesn’t matter because in the
long run you’ll always win’.44
6.
Jimmy’s bald claim that in the long run you’ll always win, of course,
comes with many caveats – that one must have the frequencies right,
that one can play long enough to endure a bad run and thereby take
advantage of the long-run ratios. Yet in addition to these caveats,
there are two other and much neglected caveats to face and, as well,
to appreciate how probability guides us in our lives. The first is the
one-off problem: most of the important decisions we make in life are
one offs, events that are not just single cases of the same type on
which we can project but single cases that are seldom if ever repeated
in our lives. How, then, can we stay the course on them?
Take, say, the hard case of deciding on a surgery offering a substan-
tial improvement in one’s life but with severe consequences if the
frequentist understanding of probability, it could equally well be expressed
in Bayesian or propensity terms.
44 As interviewed by Justin Rohrlich, in ‘Hunches Mean Squat: How a
Professional Gambler Invests in Sports’,Minyanville (July 10, 2012).
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surgery goes south. The surgeon reports that the operation has a
99.9% success rate – one out of a thousand goes wrong – and confi-
dently assures us of our ‘good chances’. How though are we to under-
stand this? What we dearly want to say is precisely what we should
not. What we dearly want to say, and so engage in magical thinking,
is that we, individually, have a ‘good chance’ of coming out ahead. As
if there is something – a law, a Bernoulli sequence, a propensity, the
gods of chance – working on our own behalf in this case, one’s own
case. But, after the CA and the Anti-PP, that’s not so. What we
then often do is try for the second best option, the surgeon’s point of
view, the view of the one who can say that of the patients s/he
treats by this operation, 99.9% come out well. But the surgeon’s
point of view is not available here either, just because for each of us
there is no projection. For each of us it’s a one off, seldom if ever,
to be seen again. In this case, as in so many others, we individuals
are the single case itself.
When I made this observation to my surgeon she immediately
understood. But then I noted that she would regard me as a nutter
if I did not accept her probabilistic advice on the procedure I faced.
And she agreed with that too – seeing, I believe uncomfortably, the
apparent contradiction. How to resolve it, and, I suggest, how we
in practice implicitly do resolve it, is to take the ordinary agent’s
point of view and bundle together items with similar long-run projec-
tions. The principle of bundling is this: take the one offs with similar
projections and bundle them together with all such projections. This
in effect gives us a surrogate of the surgeon’s point of view.45
45 As reported in Boston Globe (2/2/14, A17), the risk of death for
donors of part of their liver is one to five for every 1,000 transplants. Dr.
GiulianoTesta, BaylorUniversity’sDallasMedical Center’s surgical direct-
or, is cited as worrying that too much focus on rare donor deaths will
decrease the number of donors and so cost lives. In a classic instance of
the surgeon’s point of view, he observed, ‘Bad things happen all the time.
They should not take center stage with the discussions we have with the
donors’. No matter how careful you are with regulations and donors, ‘you
still cannot totally control unforeseen circumstances’. Clearly, this is the
read of the one who is in it for the long run, who knows that most of his
bets of this type by far will come out right. (Does it also provide a backdrop
for why surgeons are notoriously unsympathetic? – that, like Jimmy, they
know it’s gambling, after all?) The patients, in sharp contrast, are well
advised to know that the long odds of the surgeon are not for them. This
is not to say that one should not donate, but let’s not downplay what the
bet is on, a bundled frequency, and the profound altruism in such donations.
(My thanks to Charlene Entwistle for this reference.)
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Similar projections allow us to bundle different one offs into an
overall projection and so stay the course for them. The mathematics
is the same and the mathematics is all that counts, provisos in place.
Bundling allows us to have long-run projections of vastly different
and unrepeated types of situations that more or less share the same
(dis)confirmable idealized frequencies. In this way, then, we can play
the odds over the long run even though for most of the time we are
addressing one offs. There are three central ideas back-boning the
practice of bundling.
The first idea is that wemust be able to discern the type in the token
event, the one off, and thereby legitimately estimate how it would
play out in time. Take the problem of the newly minted coin –
tossed once and then destroyed. What is its probability of landing
heads? My answer builds on Kyburg’s reasoning that we should
favor our observation of how all coins but quarters land over our
observation of how quarters land – namely that coins, being more
numerous than quarters, offer a greater evidential base, and so,
given that they, coins and quarters, are sufficiently alike to land simi-
larly, we should take it that the data we have for all coins provides us
with a better understanding of how quarters will land than the data on
quarters alone. There is no reason, he says, to take quarters as ‘weird’
and so we should see them as landing heads in the same ratio as coins
in general do.46 By parallel reasoning, Kyburg continues, as with
quarters so with the newly minted coin: we have no reason to take
it as weird and so should regard it as of a type with all coins. What
Kyburg is in effect doing here is bundling the newly minted coin
with all coins, and, to extrapolate further, with all such projections
with a limit of 12. In this way, we can place or bundle the one off,
the newly minted coin, in a long-run sequence, however understood.
The second idea is that bundling pays off in the long run – even if
all we project on are one offs. Take, for instance, that famous (or once-
famous) one off found in Let’s Make a Deal, where the host, Monty
Hall, at the end of the game asked the contestants to choose one of
three doors, one of which had a significant prize behind it. After
they chose a door, he then opened a door with no prize behind it
and then offered them the option of switching their choice to the
door they did not choose. Should they do so? If they were playing
46 Henry Kyburg, ‘Don’t Take Unnecessary Chances!’ Synthese 132
(2002), 11. This also provides the basis of a reply to speaking of the probabil-
ity of the universe coming to be – by not seeing it as unique but as a type.
While Kyburg speaks here in frequentist terms, I could just as well have
spoken in Bayesian or propensity terminology.
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this game over the long run, if they were the surgeons in this game,
they should, surprisingly to most of us, switch; for there is a 23 prob-
ability that over the course of time they would win twice as often as they
lost.47 But the contestants have no sequence to play out here. So,
should they switch? They should, but not because the odds favor
them in this single case. Since they will never face this choice
again, there are no odds in this case as an isolated instance just
because there is no projection – no law, no Bernoulli sequence, no
propensity – for them to think in terms of the long run. But by
bundling this case with all the other 23 projections they will face in
their lives – whether one offs or repeated, whether hands of poker,
bridge, gin rummy, insurance plans, partners – they and we can see
that they will indeed win more than they lose. Not to bundle is to
be the nutter the surgeon would have taken me to be had I not
heeded her advice, for not to bundle, to treat each one off as an
isolated single case, is to doom oneself to coming out the short end
more often than not in all the one offs one faces. The bundled
long-run projections – as laws, Bernoulli sequences, propensity-
driven consequences – rule.
7.
The third idea behind the practice of bundling is to rein in any false
optimism the practice might engender. For, back to the operation,
and now given the practice of bundling, what concentrates our
mind here is that what works in this one off, what we are projecting
on, is, not this operation, but all those one offs with 99.9% projections
that we will face throughout our lives, and that, while acting on those
47 If they had been offered the choice of picking two doors or one, they
would have picked two; and the odds would not have changed on those two
doors winning two thirds of the time even after one of them had been
opened. See Peter Baumann, ‘Three Doors, Two Players, and Single-Case
Probabilities’, The American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2005), 71–79.
Bauman sees no way out here, arguing that ‘one ought to give up probabil-
istic arguments for or against switching or sticking in isolated individual
cases. They only make sense in the long run’ (76) – which I disagree with
because of the practice of bundling. For a delightful discussion of the
authoritative vitriol directed against the advice to switch as offered by
Marilyn vos Savant of Ask Marilyn fame, see Leonard Mlodinow, The
Drunkard’s Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2008), 42–45.
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projections assures us that wewill ‘win’ far far more than we ‘lose’, we
have no ideawhich of these situations will leave us with a loss – a life, a
limb, a house, a donut. Whether we will lose the life or the donut is
unknown – other than that we will lose some things or other things
over the course of time with that projection.
That is, what concentrates themind here is that one offs like surger-
ies are forced bad-odds one offs – choices that are not elective but
unavoidable and with odds that we would almost never accept in a
game. Such choices starkly illuminate the truth behind Peirce’s
warning ‘that every gambler, if he continues long enough, must
ultimately be ruined’, on the grounds that eventually one would be
hit by a deviant run that one could not overcome.48 But, even more
sobering than Peirce’s worry of a bad streak, even always winning
without enduring any bad streak, we still face the risk of forced bad-
odds one offs. We don’t project just on games but also on our
health, family, spouse, partner, friends, colleagues, financial
advisor, the market, the national arena, the international arena ...
In such situations we can’t protect ourselves by choosing which
‘game to play’ just because these are not games but are types of
cases – live and forced after William James – that we must project
on if we are to live full lives. Eventually then, and generally in a
much shorter time for most of us than Peirce’s deviant run, there
would come a series of rational choices on forced bad-odds one offs
that turn out so badly that one could not or would be hard put to
recover.49 And once we realize this, we see into Jimmy’s long-run
winner’s fallacy – that, provisos in place, ‘in the long run you’ll
always win’. You will, but not necessarily in the games you ‘must’
win. Those of us who have been ‘fortunate’ have indeed, as all
48 Charles Sanders Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed., Justus
Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955, 169. In his words, a
gambler – which here includes everyone – ‘cannot be absolutely certain
that the mean result will accord with the probabilities at all. Taking all his
risks collectively, then, it cannot be certain that they will not fail,’ for that
is what random means (ibid).
49 Ibid. 162. It is to the greatness of Peirce that he sees the falsehood of
the long-run winner’s fallacy and offers a solution – that of epistemic com-
munity. ‘I can see but one solution ... that logicality inexorably requires that
our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but
must embrace the whole community. … To be logical men should not be
“selfish”’ (162). This begins to open up the issue of the morality embedded
in reasoning probabilistically and, more generally still, the morality embed-
ded in epistemic vulnerability – of which this piece is a part.
502
Edward James
use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819115000121
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 04 Jan 2017 at 23:36:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
should, relied on the projections of these forced bad-odds one offs to
come out right, and we have been for the most part lucky.50
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50 My thanks to my philosophy department, at Bridgewater State
University, where I read a much earlier version of this at a Philosophy
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